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THE STATE OF UTAH 
----P"F \ L E D 
liN 1 4 1963 
PEARL A. LONG, wife of WILLIAM .. ' . 
T. LONG, deceased, P laintijj~ci;;"k 5~;;·;~~~--c~~;t~-iit~h----
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UT·AH, WESTERN STATES 
REFINING COMPANY and THE 





LEON A. HALGREN, 
Attorney fo·r .Plaintiff. 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
F. A. TROT·TIE·R, 
130 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
PEARL A. LONG, wife of WILLIAM 
T. LONG, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, WESTERN STATES 
REFINING COMPANY and THE 
8TATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 9867 
We agree with the first two paragraphs of the State-
ment of Facts found at page 6 of Plaintiff's Brief. But 
we do not agree with the third paragraph. 
Mr. Long did leave Moab, U ta:h about 5 :00 A.M. on 
November 26, 1960, driving his employer's truck, his 
destination being Farmington, New Mexico ; and he did 
not get any further than Cahone, Colorado, as stated 
in Plaintiff's Brief. But Plaintiff's Brief contains the 
statement that Mr. Long had an accidental injury while 
changing a tire on the truck, somewhere between Moab, 
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Utah and Cahone, Colorado. Basically one of the main 
points of conflict between the parties in tlils case is 
whether or not there was any such accident. 
In her application filed with the Industrial Commis-
sion on April 12, 1961, the applicant claimed that her 
husband received an injury on Nov. 26, 1960, "while 
lifting spare tire in rack on trailer after changing flat 
tire on equipment." (R. 2). Most of the evidence pre-
sented by the parties at the Industrial Commission's hear-
ing on October 16, 1961, related to that point. 
There was no question about the fact that Mr. Long 
was in the course of his employment on November 26, 
1960 from 5 :00 A. M. until he became sick about three 
hours later near Cahone, Colrado. Therefore, the only 
substantial question involved in the Industrial Commis-
sion's hearing on October 16, 1961, was whether he had 
an accidental injury during that three hour period. It is 
the contention of the Defendants that he did not have 
any such accident. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 
DECISION DENYING APPLICANT'S CLAIM 
FOR COMPENSATION BENEFITS, WAS 
LEGAL AND PROPER. 
The record does not show what time of day Mrs. 
Long first saw her husband in the hospital at Cortez, 
Colorado, but it was sometime in the afternoon of N ovem-
ber 26, 1960, because she had to drive from Moab, Utah 
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to Cortez after she received the telephone call about 
10 :30 A. M., notifying her that Mr. Long was in the 
hospital in Cortez. 
Even if Mrs. Long's testimony that her husband made 
certain statements to her in the hospital at Cortez, (R. 
22-26), were considered to be in the category of res gestae, 
the R.eferee and Industrial Commission· were still under 
the necessity of evaluating her testimony that Mr. Long 
told her he had an accidental injury while changing a 
tire. They were not required to accept her testimony 
as conclusive proof that Mr. Long had such .an accident. 
She certainly was an interested witness. It would be to 
her advantage to have the Commission believe her testi-
mony in that respect. The Referee and the ·Commission 
had two bases upon which they might disbelieve it, (as 
they apparently did disbelieve it). (1) They might dis-
believe that Mr. Long told his wife that he had such an 
accident; or ( 2) if they believed that she correctly quoted 
her husband's statement about an accident, they might 
have believed that he was incorrect in making such a 
statement. 
'There was no evidence from any other witness to 
corroborate Mrs. Long's testimony that her husband 
had an accident during the morning hours of Nov. 26, 
1960. On the contrary, the testimony of all of the other 
witnesses was to effect that there was no evidence that 
any flat tire had been repaired or removed from the truck 
which Mr. Long drove that morning. 
Applicant's attorney called Mr. Rodney M. Day as 
their first witness. (R. 13) Mr. Day was executive assist-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
ant of the ernployer c01npany; and he had signed the <'lll-
ployer's report of injury, dated December 19, 1960, in 
which was reported an accident to Mr. Long at 8:30A.M., 
Nov. 26, 1960, of "changing a flat tire," etc. (R. 1) 
Mr. Day testified that the applicant, Mrs. Long, was the 
one who told him that Mr. Long had such an accident, and 
she gave him that information after Mr. Long's death. 
(R. 16-117 and 19-20). Mr. Day had not talked with Mr. 
Long himself. Also Mr. Day testified that afterwards he 
1nade some investigation relating to whether there actu-
ally was a flat tire. All the information he could obtain 
was that there was no flat tire. (R. 18-19). This testi-
mony was adduced by applicant's attorney in questioning 
Mr. Day as their witness. 
S.teve Mason, the truck driver who went to Cahone, 
Colorado .and drove the truck from there to Cortez, 
testified he did not see any flat tire. The whole truck and 
trailer, including all of the tires, were practically brand 
new. They had been purchased new in August, 1960, 
just three months prior to that time. (R. 45-50). 
Joseph Kirkham, adjuster for the State Insurance 
Fund, made a trip to Cahone and Cortez, Colorado during 
the month prior to the Industrial Commission's hearing. 
He talked with several people who had seen Mr. Long and 
conversed with him in the morning of the day he became 
sick, Nov. 26, 1960. (R. 40-43 and 51-55). Admittedly Mr. 
Kirkham's testimony in some respects was hearsay; but 
it served to explain and clarify some of the facts in issue. 
Each of the men who saw Mr. Long at Cahone about 
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8:00 A. M. on Nov. 26, 1960, told Mr. Kirkham that 1lr. 
Long appeared to be sick and he said he was sicik, but Mr. 
Long did not say anything to them about having an 
accident or changing a tire. 
Section 35-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, reads: 
"The commission shall not be hound by the 
usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, 
or by any technical or formal rules of procedure, 
other than as herein provided; but may make its 
investigations in such manner as in its judgment 
is best calculated to ascertain the substantial 
rights of the parties and to carry out justly the 
spirit of this title." 
Under this provision, the Supreme Court of Utah 
has held that the Industrial Commission may permit 
hearsay evidence to be given in a hearing, but that hear-
say evidence alone will not support an award of compen-
sation. Spring Can;yon Co.al Co. vs Ind. Comm., 74 Utah 
103, 277 Pac. 206; G.arfield Smelting Co. vs Ind. Comm., 
53 Utah 133, 178 Pac. 57. 
Later in the hearing,, Mr. Day testified that the rules 
required each driver to make a report in his log sheet 
·for the day, of every stop he made during his shift, 
which would include any stop for changing a tire. (R. 
30-36). Mr. Long's log sheet for November 26, 1960, did 
not contain any entry or reference to changing a tire, 
even though it was written at the request of Mr. Long, 
by Mrs. Long in her handwriting. (R. 37-38). This is 
some indication of the fact that there was no such stop 
by him that day for the purpose of changing a tire. 
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It is now well settled that in an Industrial Commis-
sion case the burden of proof is upon the applicant to 
establish a clailn for compensation. Graste:it vs Ind. 
Comm., 76 Utah 487, 290 Pac. 764; Wherritt vs Ind. 
Comrn., 100 Utah 68, 110 P.2d 374, General Mills, Inc. vs 
Ind. Comm., 101 Utah 214, 120 P.2d 379. 
In the Industrial Commission's decision which is 
contained in its Order dated November 25, 1961, (R. 62), 
the Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law of the Referee were adopted as the Findings and 
Conclusions of the Commission. The second and third 
paragraphs of the Referee's Recommended Findings, 
etc., (R. 6·3), read: 
"The Referee, having heard the testimony 
adduced by the parties and having considered the 
files and records attendant to the claim herein, 
finds that no competent evidence was presented 
to support the claim of applicant that the death 
of deceased resulted by accident arising out of 
or in the course of his employment with defendant, 
Western States Refining Company. 
Based on the foregoing finding, the Referee 
concludes that applicant's claim should be denied." 
The language of the Referee may not have been the 
best way of saying it, but in substance it amounts to the 
same as: 
"The Referee finds that Mr. Long did not 
have a compensable accident resulting in his 
death." 
In the case of Thompson vs Ind. Comm., 82 Utah 247, 
23 P.2d 930, the Supreme Court held that an Industrial 
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Conunission finding that "the applicant failed to sustain 
his burden of proof by competent evidence that injury 
was the result of accident in course of his employment," 
was equivalent to finding that applicant did not sustain 
.an injury by accident arising out of or in course of his 
employment. 
If the applicant's testimony that her husband told 
her he had an accident while changing a tire, was not 
corroborated or supported by any other person or evi-
dence, the Referee and the Cornrnissin had good reason 
for disbelieving her testimony relating to that allegation, 
or to disbelieve the truthfulness of any such statement 
which may have been made by Mr. Long to his wife. 
In the case of Gagos vs Ind. Comm., 87 Utah 101, 48 
P.2d 449, the Supreme Court's opinion contains the 
following: 
"The fact finder is not always required to 
believe the uncontradicted evidence of a witness, 
as will be seen from the text and the cases cited 
in support thereof in 23 C. J. p. 47, sec. 179'1. 
There are a number of facts and circumstances in 
the instant case which may have caused the 
commission to disbelieve the testimony of Mr. 
Gagos. He was interested in the result of the 
controversy." 
In the case of White vs N. P. Mettome Company, 
2 Utah 2d 415, 275 P.2d 880, the Court's opinion contains 
the following at page 417 : 
"The only evidence which even faintly im-
plied that applicant could have reasonably ex-
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pected to be supported by decedent having come 
from applicant herself, and in view of the fact that 
no one else was present at the supposed conver-
sations, and also in view of the fact that decendent 
was dead and could not be there to deny them, the 
Commission could reasonably disbelieve the ap-
plicant and find as it did. S.ee Smith vs Ind. 
Comm., 104 Utah 318, 140 P.2d 314." 
In the case of Smith vs Ind. Comm., 104 Utah 318, 
140 P.2d 314, E. vVesley Smith, manager of the Conti-
nental Building, claimed that he suffered an inguinal 
hernia on March 18, 19'42, when he slipped on a stairway 
and had to jump about six steps to the landing below. 
There were no witnesses to this. He did not report it to 
his employer or any doctor or lose any time from work. 
When he took a physical examination to join the Army 
on June 7, it was discovered that he had a hernia. He 
was operated on June 23. After a hearing, the Industrial 
Commission denied his application for compensation 
benefits. It was app:arent from the wording of the 
Commission's decision that they did not believe the 
applicant's story as to the happening of the accident. 
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court sustained 
the Commission's decision. At page 323 of the Court's 
opinion is found the following language: 
"The weakness of plaintiff's case is that there 
is no evidence other than his own testimony that 
he had an accident, or the details or effects there-
of, and he is an interested witness. By the nature 
of the accident it is impossible to contradict his 
testimoy. Such a situation presents an oppor-
tunity for imposition. A person who discovers he 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
has a hernia can readily make up details of a 
story which would prove that it was caused by an 
accident in the course of his employment. Under 
such circumstances he would naturally tell that it 
occurred while he was alone, he would describe the 
usual symptons when a hernia is caused and would 
make a plausible explanation of why he did not 
report it sooner. The person making such a 
fabrication can do so knowing that no one can 
directly contradict his testimony. Under these 
circumstances would it be unreasonable for the 
commission to refuse to believe his story~ 
"'This question must be answered in the nega-
tive. Everyone recognizes that an interested wit-
ness is not entitled to as much credibility as one 
who is not interested. 
"In Norris vs Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 256, 
61 P.2d 413, 415, this court said: 
" 'But in order to reverse the commission 
* * *it must appear at least that (a) the evidence 
is uncontradicted and (b) there is nothing in the 
record which is intrinsically discrediting to the 
uncontradicting testimony and (c) that the un-
contradicted evidence is not wholly that of inter-
ested witnesses*** and (d) the uncontradicted evi-
dence is such as to carry a measure of conviction 
to the reasonable mind and sustain the burden of 
proof, and (e) precludes any other explanation or 
hypothesis as being more or equally as reasonable, 
and (f) there is nothing in the record which would 
indicate that the presence of the witnesses gave 
the commission such an advantage over the court 
in aid to its conclusions that the conclusions 
should for that reason not be disturbed.' 
"This indicates that where the evidence is 
wholly that of an interested witness the trier of 
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fact may reasonably refuse to believe it. Of 
course the fact that a witness is corroborated on 
one point does not require a trier of fact to believe 
him on other material points where there is no 
corroboration. In view of the fact that applicant 
was the only witness to testify to the accident, to 
the resulting sensations, and the further fact that 
these facts were by their very nature exclusively 
within his own knowledge and therefore could not 
be controverted by other testimony, the commis-
sion could reasonably refuse to believe his testi-
mony, which they apparently did." 
We do not understand why Plaintiff's attorney at 
page 8 of his brief, cited the cases of K eUy vs. l11Jd. 
Comm., 80 Utah 73, 12 P.2d 1112·; and Kent vs Ind. 
Comm., 89 Utah 381, 57 P.2d 724; and Ostler vs Ind. 
Comm., 84 Utah 428, 36 P2d 95; and Wherritt v. Ind. 
Comm., 100 Urtah 68, 1110 P.2d 374; and Woodburn v. Ind. 
Comm., 111 Utah 39·3, 181 P.2d 209. In each of those five 
cases the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the decision 
of the Industrial Commission denying the applicant's 
claim for compensation benefits. In the Kent case, at 89 
Utah 384-385, the Supreme Court's opinion contains the 
following: 
"When the Industrial Commission denies 
compensation and the case is brought to this court 
for review, a different type of search of the 
record is demanded than when the Industrial 
Commission makes an award of compensation and 
the record is likewise brought here for review. 
In the denial of compensation, the record 
must disclose that there is material, substantial, 
competent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to 
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make a disregard of it justify the conclusion, as 
a matter of law, that the Industrial Commission 
arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the 
evidence or unreasonably refused to believe such 
evidence. * * * * * 
When we are asked to overturn the findings 
and "Conclusions of the commission denying com-
pensation, it must be made clearly to appear that 
the commission acted wholly without cause in 
rejecting or in refusing to believe or give effect 
to the evidence. It was not intended by the W ark-
men's Compensation Act that this court, in 
matters of evidence, should to any extent substi-
tute the judgment of the court upon factual mat-
ters for the judgment of the commission." 
Our present case is quite dissimilar factually to the 
case of Jones vs Cal. Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 
P.2d 644, which was also cited at page 8 of Plaintiff's 
Brief, in which case the majority opinion of the Supreme 
Court held that the evidence required the Commission to 
award compensation. 
In the Woodburn case, at 111 Utah 399, the Supreme 
Court's opinion quoted with approval from a previous 
Utah Supreme Court case, Lorange vs Ind. Comm., 107 
Utah 261, 153 P .2d 272 : 
"Unless therefore it can be said, upon the 
whole record, that the commission clearly acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously in making its findings 
and decision, this court is powerless to interfere 
* * * It was not intended, * * * that this court, in 
matters of evidence, should to any extent substi-
tite its judgment for the judgment of the com-
mission." 
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In the Wherritt case, supra, the following syllabus 
briefly gives the reason for the Supreme Court's decision 
affirming the Industrial Commission's denial of com-
pensation benefits : 
"Unless Court could say that conclusion of 
Commission on question of whether death oc-
curred in course of employment was wrong 
because only opposite conclusion could be drawn 
from facts, it was bound to affirm decision." 
.And in the case of Johnson vs Industrial OO'mm., 
93 Utah 493, 73 P .2d 1308 : 
"Unless Supreme Court can say that Commis-
sion acted arbitrarily, award must be sustained." 
With respect to !1rs. Long's testimony that Mr. 
Long told her he had an .accident on Nov. 26, 1960, 
Plaintiff's brief failed to mention the case of Ogden 
Iron Wo·rks vs Ind. Comm., 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376, 
which might have the appearance of being in their favor. 
The evidence in that case, however, was much stronger 
than was the evidence in the case at bar. In the Ogden 
Iron Works case, the widow of the deceased employee, 
IIarold Parkinson, testified that when he came home from 
work the evening of March 24, 1941, he said he had a se-
vere headache; and he also had a bump (lump) on his 
head. She .asked him how he got it. He answered that he 
had craGked his head on his machine at work that day. 
Parkinson also made the same explanation to his doctor. 
A fellow employee also testified that while he was sitting 
at Parkinson's machine earlier that d.ay Parkinson told 
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him to be careful when arising because Parkinson had 
given his head a dirty bump upon the levers of the 
machine that day. Parkinson died from the effects of a 
cerebral hemorrhage about two weeks later. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's 
award of compensation to the widow. The Court's 
opinion .at page 502, said: 
"We are not prepared to say that the Com~ 
mission could not, frmn these facts infer and find 
that the bump on the head was received while at 
work at the boring machine and that such bump 
caused the hemorrhage, from which the deceased 
died." 
That language indicates that even with the evidence 
which there was in the record in that case, if the Indus-
trial Commission had decided that the case was not 
compsensable, the Supreme Court would have sustained 
the Commission's denial of compensation. 
POINT 2. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 
PROCEDURE OF NOT TAKING MEDICAL 
'TESTIMONY A'T THE HEARING WAS IN 
AOCORD,ANCE WITH LAW. 
Section 35-1-77, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, com-
mences: 
"Upon the filing of a claim for compensation 
for injury by accident, or for death, arising out of 
or in the course of employment, and where the 
employer or insurance carrier denies liability, the 
commission shall refer the medical aspects of the 
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case to a medical panel appointed by the commis-
sion," etc. 
·under this provision, the Industrial Commission is 
required to refer medical questions to a medical panel. 
It n1ust logically follow that the Commission is not 
supposed to go into the 1nedical questions which may 
be involved in a controverted case unless and until such 
medical questions have been considered by a medical 
panel as provided by Section 35-1-77. 
In our present case, it was first necessary to have a 
determination of the question whether Mr. Long actually 
had an industrial accident, (as applicant alleged he had). 
After the hearing was held .and the evidence was taken 
regarding that question, the Referee and the Industrial 
Commission apparently were of the opinion that Mr. 
Long had not had an industrial .accident. There being no 
accidental injury in the course of his employment, it was 
therefore not an industrial case. Consequently, there was 
no medical question for the Industrial Commission to 
refer to a medical panel. 
It is now quite late for Mrs. Long's attorney to bring 
up for the first time, after the case has reached the 
Supreme Court, .an objection relating to the Industrial 
Commission's action of excluding medical testimony at 
the Commission's hearing on October 16, 1961. The writ-
ten Notice of the hearing, (R. 9), which was sent to Mrs. 
Long and the other parties, did not have anything typed 
on it about Medical testimony. Apparently after it was 
typed', someone wrote on the original notice which is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
part of the Industrial Commission's office record, the 
handwritten notation, ''No Medical." 
At the commencement of the hearing on October 16, 
1961, (R. 12), the Referee said to Mr. Larson, (who was 
appJicant's .attorney at that time) : 
"Mr. Larson, if you'd like to proceed. There 
will be no medical testimony given at this hearing. 
· We're not concerned with medical testimony, but 
with the particular facts involved in the case." 
Mr. Larson then said: 
"I would assume then, l\Ir. Robison, that we 
don't need to touch on anything that has to do 
with the medical aspects, except as they might 
touch on his injury." 
The Referee then said: 
"We're concerned here with whether the al-
leged injury occurred within the scope of employ-
ment of the deceased. Whether it would then come 
within the \Vorkmen's Compensation Act." 
Mr. Larson then said: 
"I'd like to call Mr. Day then." 
Applicant's attorney did not make any objection to 
what the Referee had just said. He did not s.ay they 
wanted to, or were prepared to, put on any evidence of a 
medical nature at that hearing. At no time thereafter did 
applicant or her attorney notify the Commission that 
they wanted to introduce any medical evidence to cor-
roborate Mrs. Long's testimony that Mr. Long had the 
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accidental injury which she alleged he had on Nov. 26, 
1960. 
Now for the first time, at pages 13 & 14 of Plaintiff's 
Brief, Mrs. Long's present attorney objects to the 
Industrial Commission's procedure of "no medical testi~ 
mony" at the hearing. He says : 
4
'If the blow to Mr. Long's stomach and chest 
took place as shown in the record, medical test-
imony m,ay have further substantiated this fact." 
Even at this point, Plaintiff's attorney has not speci-
fied any particular medical testimony which they have 
desired to, or could produce, to substantiate her testi-
mony concerning an accident to Mr. Long. 
The attending physician, Dr. James D·. Hites of 
Dolores, Colorado, sent a report on a "SURGICAL 
REPORT" form of the Industrial ·Commission of Utah, 
dated 3-8-61. (Exhibit 2:), (R. 59). This is one of the 
reports referred to by the Referee as being part of the 
Industrial ·Commission's record. (R. 42-44). Dr. Hites' 
letter dated Oct. 2, 1961, (Exhibit 3), R. 60-61), would 
also be in the same category, inasmuch as it modified and 
explained part of the material contained in Exhibit 2. 
Mrs. Long's attorney at the hearing, and her present 
attorney (at page 12 of his brief), were willing to have 
the Commission accept Dr. Hites' report on the Commis-
sion's form (Exhibit 2), but they did not want the Com-
mission to accept Dr. Hites' explantory letter dated 
October 2, 1961, (Exhibit 3) as evidence, even though 
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both documents were signed by Dr. Hites. The Commis-
sion properly admitted both documents into evidence. 
·The particular parts of Dr. Hites' letter of October 
2, 1961, which are of importance, are his explanation 
that the statement about the tire episode in his report of 
March 8, 1961, (Exhibit 2), was typed up by his secretary 
from information which 1\frs. Long had given to said 
secretary over the telephone; and Dr. Hites' further 
remark that there was no mention made during Mr. 
Long's first ten days of hospitalization about the onset 
of his pain being associated with an accident. (R. 61). 
Dr Hites is a resident and medical practitioner in 
the State of Colorado. As such, he was not under the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Law 
with respect to making the report (Exhibit 2) to the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. If that report is .admis-
sable, then his supplemental report, which is his letter 
of Oct. 2, 1961, (Exhibit 3), is likewise admissable as 
evidence. 
CON·CLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision and order 
of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed by this 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KES'L·EH, 
Attorney Gene·ral, 
F. A. TROT'TIER, 
Attorneys for Defend,am.ts 
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